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While  the  issue  of child  labor  in  developing  countries  has  received  increased  attention in
recent  years,  most of the  empirical  analysis  has been  based  on  one-time  cross  sectional
samples.  While this may give an idea of the incidence  and determinants of child labor at one
point  in time,  it is silent  about the  dynamics  of child  labor  over time  and sometimes  may
even  be influencing policy choices  against child labor adversely.  This paper attempts to fill
this  void,  analyzing  the  dynamics  of  child  labor  and  schooling  in  Ghana,  aiming  at
investigating  the impact of broad economic  reforms on child labor and schooling in the short,
medium and long run. Starting from a premise that the simple - direct  - relationship between
poverty  and  child  labor,  which  has often been  seen  as  the  feature  of child  labor,  may not
adequately capture the multi facetted nature of child labor, we find evidence  of asymmetries
in  the child  labor-poverty  link, as  well  as quite  complex  dynamics  in the  evolution  of child
labor and schooling and their determinants  over time. Most notably, child labor is found to be
responsive  to  poverty  in the  short  run,  but not in the  long  run,  while  child  schooling  is
unaffected by poverty  in short  run but  responds  in the  medium-  to long  run.  These results
suggest  that  child  labor  acts  as  an  economic  buffer  of the  household  in the  short  run,
regardless  of changes  in the  economic  environment  or perceptions  of the latter  following
economic reforms,  thus supporting - and refining - the poverty explanation of child labor.
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1. Introduction
Child labor is a pervasive phenomenon  in developing  countries. For example,  ILO estimates
that there  are more than 250 million child laborers between the ages of 7 and  14 in the world
of whom at  least  120 million  are involved  in work  full time,  ILO  (1997),  while UNICEF
estimates suggest that as much as 400 million children  are working,  UNICEF (1999).  At the
same time, human capital has been shown to be an  essential element in a sustainable growth
strategy  for  any  economy.  Hence,  arguably,  child  labor  which  adversely  affects  the
accumulation  of  human  capital  is  highly  costly  in  terms  of  the  future  growth  and
development  of a country.  For equity reasons,  too, it is considered highly detrimental:  child
labor  forecloses  options  arising  from  increasing  educational  levels  to  the  individual
concerned, perpetuating  and even widening existing inequalities  in society at large.  For these
reasons and for the ethical repugnance the phenomenon of child labor generates,  solutions are
increasingly being  sought by policymakers,  international  organizations  and aid agencies,  to
reduce and ultimately eliminate it.
For all of these reasons, the analysis of child labor has received increased  attention in recent
years.  While these  attempts  to grapple  with the  economics  of child  labor  theoretically  and
empirically  have  led  to  some  definitional  and  conceptual  clarity,  however,  the  existing
literature suffers from various weaknesses.
First, the nature of the data sometimes makes the analysis  less applicable  to child labor than
could  be  desired,  simply because  the  analysis of child  labor was  not on the  agenda of the
designers  of the  survey.  Thus,  researchers  have  often  had  to  merely  use  a  survey  for
analyzing  child labor,  which in most cases did not try to gather  information  specifically  for
*  The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Ghana Statistical Service
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Ithe  analysis  of child  labor.  Clearly,  policy  advice  from  surveys  plagued  with  such  data
problems are not useful. Indeed, it may even be harmful to the understanding of the nature of
child labor and its eradication.
Second, related to this is the fact that most analyses of child labor are based on a single cross-
section.  However,  child  labor  is  inherently  dynamic,  its  structure  and  composition  being
likely to change over time in developing countries  as a response to reforms promoting higher
growth and increased  economic and human development. There are significant differences  in
the nature  and  characteristics of different  kinds of child labor across  space and time - their
causes  and consequences  also differ.'  It is crucial to recognize this essential characteristic  of
the phenomena from the point of view of correct policy and the efficient use of scarce public
resources  for  amelioration  of the  problem.  However,  little  work has  been  done  so  far  on
analyzing the dynamics of child labor.
This  study  is  a  preliminary  undertaking  to  understand  child  labor  as  a multi-dimensional
dynamic  phenomenon,  linked to  child schooling,  in the context  of broad economic  policies
undertaken  by developing  countries  focusing  on the  experience  of Ghana.  In  particular,  we
conjecture  that  the  popular  belief of  a  simple,  possibly  linear,  relationship  between  the
welfare  or poverty of the household  and  child  labor is far  too  simplistic.  Child  labor is  a
multi-dimensional  phenomenon,  in particular, it cuts  through time,  as well as through  space.
Also, child  labor  is likely  to be influenced  by the overall  (macro)  economic  conditions.  In
particular,  the incidence of and determinants of child labor may be expected to be affected by
economic growth and, thus, indirectly, by economic policies aimed at fostering growth.
With this in mind, we propose the following  three hypotheses to be tested in the analysis  of
incidence  and  determinants of child labor  and  schooling in Ghana over time:  (1)  the short-,
medium-  and  long-run responses  of child  labor and  schooling  from economic  policies  are
likely to differ.  In particular,  in the short run, the policies may have no impact and/or not be
credible.  Hence,  child  labor  and  schooling  may  be  unaffected  in  the  short  run,  but  may
respond in the medium- to long run. Specifically,  we suggest that the incidence  of child labor
will  decline  over  time  in  response  to  economic  policies,  aimed  at  economic  growth  and
eradication  of child  labor.  On  the  other  hand,  such  policies  - coupled  with  policies  to
XSee Parsons and Goldin (1989)  for a study of late  l9t' century US.
2strengthen  education - are likely to affect schooling  in the long run, though possibly  not in
the short run. Related to this first hypothesis is (2) the relative importance of the determinants
of child labor are likely to change over time. In particular,  child labor would seem to be more
responsive to poverty in the short run, while non-responsive  in the long run,  due to the  fact
that in the short run, households  would want to use child labor as a buffer against economic
shocks  to  the  households,  whereas  in  the  long  run,  once  the  changes  in  the  economic
environment  from the economic reforms have materialized,  the household  will be less prone
to  use  child  labor  as  a buffer  against  economic  shocks.  Similarly,  related  to  this  is  the
conjecture  that (3)  the relative importance  of the determinants of child schooling are likely
to change  over time, and in opposite directions of those of child labor: in the short run, child
schooling would seem to be unresponsive  to changes in the poverty status of the household,
due  to the use of child labor as  a buffer against  economic  shocks  to the households  in the
short  run,  implying  that  children  will  be  withheld  from  school  in  the  short  run,  despite
changes  in  the  economic  environment  or in  the perceptions  of the economic  environment.
The  changed  poverty  status  of the  household  has  to  fully  materialize,  after  which  child
schooling will then adjust.
Note that child  labor  and  child  schooling  are not merely  each  others  mirror images.  Most
notably, children  may be idle, doing neither2 (so-called "loafing" children)  or do both.  Also,
the determinants  of child  labor and child schooling - as well  as their relative magnitudes  -
may be different.  While most notably due to the reasons  discussed in hypotheses  (2) and (3),
such differences  could  also  come  about due  to attitudes  and  tastes towards  child  labor  and
schooling differing across as well as within regions  and/or urban/rural  locations.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section motivates the paper by discussing
inter-linkages  between  economic  growth,  economic  reforms  and  child  labor.  Section  3
reviews  issues  in  child  labor  and  household  decision  making,  which  in  turn  serves  to
formalize the issues involved in capturing them in a theoretical economic model as well as its
estimable,  econometric  counterpart  in section 4.  Section 5 briefly  discusses  the evolution  of
the  Ghanaian  economy  and .presents  a  preliminary  descriptive  analysis  of child  labor
incidence,  determinants  and  dynamics  in  Ghana.  The  econometric  analysis  of child  labor
In case of insufficient nutrition,  indeed, "doing nothing" may be the optimal response.
3determinants and dynamics  in Ghana follows in section  6. Finally,  section 7 summarizes  and
concludes as well as provides avenues for further research.
2.  Economic  Growth, Economic  Reforms and Child Labor
Many developing countries in the last two decades have undertaken major economic reforms
- especially stabilization and structural  adjustment policies - aimed  at making the structure of
the  economy more  market  oriented  and conducive  to  sustained economic  growth.  Many of
these reforms have been pursued in the wake of macroeconomic  crises - declining output and
rising  inflation  leading  to  severe  setbacks  economy  wide.  A  typical  package  of
macroeconomic  reforms  comprises  of  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  so  called
'Washington Consensus', Broad and Cavanagh (1999).
Macroeconomic  crises  and  even  subsequent  reforms  do  not  affect  all  households
identically.  Rather  their  effects  tend  to  vary  across  sectors  of employment,  income/wealth
levels,  geographic  location,  gender  and  age  and  other  factors.  The  analysis  of household
responses  to crises and to stabilization and structural adjustment policies  has been pursued in
its own right, especially  the supply  response of rural peasant  households  to  changes in the
prices  and  incomes,  Binswanger  (1989).  Households  combine  the  characteristics  of
producers,  consumers  and  suppliers  of  factors  of  production  (especially  labor  power)
simultaneously (which makes their behavior a complex task to analyze).
Thus,  changes  in  market  prices  will  influence  the  behavior  of  households  as
producers,  consumers  and suppliers of factors of production simultaneously.  The net effect of
economic crises and reforms  on household behavior may be ambiguous.  It will depend upon
the magnitude  and direction of price/substitution  and income  effects.  It will  also depend  on
other  factors  such  as  the  stage  of development  the  economy  is in.and  the  nature  of the
markets  - their  imperfection  and/or  their  absence  - in which  the  households  participate  -
especially  labor  markets  and  their  characteristics.3 Labor  markets  are  one  of  the  most
important  channels  through  which  macroeconomic  policies  are  mediated.  Contractions  in
aggregate  demand  have  short-run  impacts  on  households  as  demand  for  labor  declines.
People may become unemployed,  work fewer hours,  find work in the informal  sector and/or
3For example,  imperfect and/or missing markets will impose additional  constraints  on household  optimization.
Market signals may be weak and noisy due to market imperfections  and incompleteness attenuating the linkages
between macroeconomic changes  and households'  behavioral responses.
4increasingly become  self-employed.  If incomes are falling due to falling wages and/or higher
relative prices of goods, the labor force participation  of households may increase - especially
those  of secondary  workers  such  as  spouses  and  children  - to  simply  maintain  household
budgets,  ),  Eele,  Hay  and Hoddinot  (1993),  Skoufias  (1994).  These  short run effects  can
have  adverse  long term  impacts  - for example  due to  a permanent  reduction  in  the human
capital accumulation of children who may have joined the labor market as a rational response
to  short term adversities  but remain permanent  workers  even when economic  recovery  gets
underway.  Furthermore,  to  assess  the  impact  of economic  reforms  on  the  incidence  and
characteristics  of child labor in particular,  we will need to enter the realm of intra-household
allocation processes given the complex interdependence  of time use of adults and children in
a household.
On  a  more  general  note,  the  effect  of growth  in  reducing  poverty  and  increasing
household  and  individual  well-being  is  more  complicated  than  the  simple  'trickle-down'
story.  It  is  now  recognized  that  these  effects  are  determined  by  the  complex  interplay
between the nature and composition of growth,  household behavior  and government  policies
and  expenditures.4 Economic  growth  in all  developing  countries has  been  accompanied by
increasing  rates  of industrialization  and  urbanization.  Not  only  the  formal  sector  but  the
informal sector  has been growing and at  a more rapid pace than the  former.  Most children
(and  other members  of poor and many non-poor households)  find wage  work  in the urban
and  rural  informal  sectors  in a  range  of activities.  Rapid  growth  of the  informal  sector
presents increasing income generating activities  for children. It is relatively easier to enter the
informal  sector  and does not necessarily  require  fixed  costs  such as  those  for entering  the
formal sector, Hill (1983).
Given that agriculture  continues to be the main occupation of the majority of people
in all developing countries, and that the poor are found in greater concentration  in rural areas
and in  agricultural  activities,  economic  reforms  that improve the terms  of trade  in  favor of
agriculture  may result  in  a  greater  incidence  of child  labor with  the  increase  in  available
economic opportunities.S  This can be considered a short term behavioral response to changes
4Of  particular  importance  for  poverty  alleviation  and  increased  household  welfare  is  how  growth  affects
households  in the lowest income categories.  Most growth episodes in developing countries  have tended  to leave
the bottom twenty percent of the population in terms of income distribution untouched.
5The impact will be greater, the lower are the expected returns from a low quality, irrelevant education system.in relative prices (substitution  effect).  If, on the other hand, as  a result of reforms,  the labor
market  becomes  more  responsive  to human  capital  attainment,  this  will increase  incentives
for households  to  invest in the  education  of their children  and  reduce  (at least  some)  child
labor. This is  a longer term response being  an investment decision  (income effect).  The net
result  of economic reforms  on the incidence of child  labor can thus vary depending  on the
length of time being considered and intensity of each effect on the specific context.
Child  labor itself comprises  a whole  range of activities,  with usually specialization
along  gender and  age lines.  The  distribution  of child  labor by gender  and  age  and type  of
activity  is also  likely to  change as  a result of reforms - it may make one category  of child
laborers  better  off (usually  boys)  and  another  worse  off  (usually  girls).  After  this  brief
discussion of the links between economic  growth, economic reforms  and child labor we now
go on to present some important issues related to the analysis of child labor from the previous
literature.
3.  Issues  in Child Labor and Household  Decision-Making
In order to "set the stage"  for the empirical  analysis,  it would seem  fruitful to briefly review
some  important  issues  that  arise  in the  analysis  of child  labor6. This  will  both  serve  as  a
general theoretical background of the empirical analysis as well as highlight issues that needs
to be incorporated in the latter.
Households  are settings for important productive  activities,  many of which are done
by  children,  Skoufias  (1994).  Child  labor  seems  to  play  many  roles  in  a  household's
economy:  provide labor input in the family farm or enterprise, work in the market for wages;
do household chores  to complement  adults'  efforts or substitute for them to release  them for
wage work; as consumption and/or income smoothing device.  From a purely economic  point
of view, a complex of demand side and supply side and short term and long termn  issues seem
to be at work in child labor outcomes.  In this section,  we will locate the child labor decision
in the context of household decision-making  as well as the other factors  that impinge upon it
and mediate  it. We will also  evaluate current theoretical-analytical  and empirical-descriptive
literature  that  tries  to  understand  the  child  labor  issue  but  with  an  eye  for  insights  this
6  For an  excellent survey  of economic  theories of household behavior,  see Bergstrom  (1996)  and  Strauss  and
Thomas (1995).
6literature might provide to our two  assertions above - that child labor is a multi-dimensional
and a dynamic issue.
ChUd Labor and Poverty:
Among the causes of child labor, poverty is often cited as the most important one, and in the
same vein,  economic  growth  considered  a necessary  condition  for its reduction.  It may be
conjectured  that  most child  laborers  belong  to  poor households  who  need  their  children's
income to supplement their household budget and who would experience  a substantial loss in
welfare if children were sent to school, not only because of direct costs of schooling, but also
due to losses from foregone income, Bonnet (1993).
Theories of the child labor-poverty interaction  include those that base their explanation of its
existence  on  the  low  incomes  of households  with  or  without  credit  constraints.  A  recent
paper by Basu  and  Van  (1998),  for  example,  makes  the  assumption that  the non-work  of
children  is  a  'luxury good'  for households.  Households  offer  the  labor of their  children  if
income is below  a certain threshold level and not if it is above it. The extent of child labor is
determined  by  demand  conditions  and  equilibrium  in  the  labor  market.  They  show  the
possibility of multiple  equilibria:  a) high  equilibrium wages  and no  child  labor and b)  low
equilibrium  wages  and positive child labor. Ranjan  (2000)  shows how child labor can  arise
due to a combination of poverty and credit constraints.  Altruistic rational parents care for the
quality of their children  and  want  to  invest  in  their  education  as  long  as  the returns  from
education are high enough. However,  faced with credit constraints (due to their poverty) they
settle for the second best choice of sending their children to work.
If the primary determinant of child labor is low household  income, then any measure to deal
with  it  will  have  to  be  household  income-based.  However,  whether  poverty  is  the  most
important reason  for child labor is still a matter of considerable debate.  Another variation on
the postulated relationship between income  levels and child labor is the inverted U for many
countries  in  West  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Andvig,  (1999).  The  evidence  from  existing
empirical  studies  is  inconclusive  oil  this  question,  Canagarajah  and  Nielsen  (1999),
Chandrasekhar  (1997).  Nevertheless,  the assertion that child labor and poverty are correlated
phenomena  is indisputable.  There  is also  little disputing that  economic  growth  is necessary
both  for  poverty  reduction  and  for  generating  the  required  resources  for  implementing
government  policies that  target child labor eradication.  The point being emphasized  here  is
7that  economic  growth per  se  may  not be  sufficient  to reduce  the  incidence  of child  labor,
Swaminathan  (1998).  Additionally,  economic  growth  may  not  even  be  necessary  for
reducing child labor, see Weiner (1991).
Child Labor and Credit Constraints:
Related  to  - although  not  identical  to  - the  poverty  explanation  of child  labor
discussed above is the possible existence of credit constraints.  Education is a commodity like
many  others.  It  is  an  investment  good  - current  resources  have  to  be  foregone  for  future
returns.  Education  may be  privately  or publicly  provided.  In developing  countries,  public
provision of education which is  free  or subsidized  is the norm.7 There  are private  costs and
benefits and social costs and benefits from educational  attainment (or lack of it) for members
of a society.  Research  indicates  that both social and private returns to investing in education
are  extremely  high,  and  the  returns  are  the  highest  for public  expenditure  on  education
compared to other categories of public expenditure, Psacharapoulous  (1994).
Given high private returns, the question arises as to why parents  do not - more or less
automatically  - send their children  to school?  It is argued that lack of access to  credit is an
important  factor  that  can prevent  households  from  investing optimally  in  the education  of
their  children,  Ranjan  (2000).  Credit  and  insurance  markets  are  beset by pervasive  market
failures everywhere in the developing world. These market  failures  are especially severe  for
low-income  households  who are  unable to provide the  requisite  collateral to  procure  loans.
Not only in developing countries but also in developed countries,  it is difficult to secure loans
for human  capital  investment  purposes.  When parents  are  unable  to  send  their  children  to
school, they may put them to work as a second best alternative  for the use of a child's time.
Imperfect or absence of credit and insurance  markets in general have been shown to
result  in  the  misallocation  of resources  at  the  household  level,  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin
(1993).  Apart  from underinvestment  in children's schooling,  imperfect  credit  and insurance
markets can have other adverse impacts  on the incidence of child labor. Child labor is one of
the devices households use to manage risk if other forms of insurance are not available.  Short
7In most  developing  countries,  the  private  schooling  sector  accounts  on  average  for  10  percent  or  less  of
student enrollment.
8term child labor may be used to smooth consumption in bad times.8 The literature analyzing
intra-household  allocation has  found that the latter depends  on endowments  and preferences
of individual  members of the household.
Similarly,  some studies find that risks are not shared perfectly within households  and
impacts  on  different  household  members  differently,  Doss  (1996),  Dercon  and  Krishnan
(1997).  Sawada  (1997)  finds  that  in  rural  Pakistan,  negative  shocks  experienced  by
households,  are  smoothed through  the use of child  labor,  but more  for girls  than  for boys.
These short term measures used by households  have  long term impacts, particularly through
their adverse influence on the effective schooling attainment of children, Hanan and Skoufias
(1997).  Some  children  may drop  out of the  schooling  system  completely  and become  full
time child laborers.  There are few empirical  studies  that test the effects of access  to credit on
the household's schooling-work decision. In general, there is no consensus whether the effect
is  positive  or  negative  - it  can  go  either  way  under  different  circumstances,  especially
depending on labor market factors and the degree of substitutability between hired labor and
family labor (Wydick,  1999).
Alternatively,  we  can  think  of  short  term  child  labor  as  an  ex-post  behavioral
response and long term child labor as an ex-ante household  strategy. This distinction in terms
of the time horizon  may be useful  for judging  the welfare properties  of child  labor and  for
policy  purposes.  It also  adds  to the list of reasons  as to  why it is important  to realize  that
there are different kinds of child labor with different causes  and consequences.  9
Child Labor and Schooling - Quality and Subsidies:
Another  important  dimension  of  child  labor  is  the  fact  that  given  the  central
importance  of education  and  schooling  in modern  societies,  it is  difficult  to  discuss child
labor  in  isolation  from  schooling.  Childhood  is  the  time  deemed  for  the  acquisition  of
education.  Work competes (at least to some extent) for a child's time with the alternatives of
8 Long term child labor,  on the other hand,  may be  due to the absolute  poverty of the  household, a portfolio
diversification strategy or a response to the relative returns  to a child's time.
9 Note  that  this  discussion  is  based  on  the  underlying  assumption  that  the  household  tries  to  minimize
consumption  and/or  income  fluctuations  in  the  same  manner  as  an  individual  does.  The  unitary  model  of
household  decision  making  has  proved  very  powerful  in terms  of analyzing  household  behavior  as  will  be
discussed  later.  However,  it has  often been rejected  in  empirical  work  as  the  true  model of the household.
Cooperative  and non-cooperative  models of household decision-making  seem to be able to capture more of the
ways in which resources and risks are allocated and/or shared within households (Doss,  1996).
9schooling  and  leisure.  In  the  neo-classical  framework  of the  economics  of the  household
(Becker,  1965)  rational  optimizing  households  allocate  their  children's  time  (as  well  as
adults'  time) where  they  perceive  the  marginal  returns  to  be  the  highest  depending  upon
available economic  opportunities and endowments.
Moreover,  as  has  been  discussed  above,  education  is  an  investment  good  where
current costs have to be borne for expected (but uncertain) returns in the future.  Many studies
document and estimate both the private and social returns to education.  It has generally been
found that both kinds of returns to education are very high in developing countries,  and of all
levels  of education,  returns  to  primary  education  are  the  highest,  Psacharopoulos  (1994).
Given  such  high  returns  why,  then,  is  the  demand  for  education  and/or  participation  in
education  low  in  developing  countries?  If  the  poor  lack  sufficient  funds  to  bear  the
opportunity cost of education  of their children on the part of poor households  and have little
or no access  to credit, then even if returns to education  are high, they may be constrained  to
choose work over the schooling of their children.
We also  have to look towards the available  economic opportunities  and the  quantity
and quality of educational  services  that the poor have access  to.  As is generally the  case,  if
opportunities for the poor are mostly found in the informal sector - in kinds of activities that
require  little or no formal schooling  - and if schooling services are either not available or are
of poor quality, the returns from education may be so low that parents will rationally want to
send their children to work where relative returns may be higher.
When  household resources  are  scarce,  there  may be intra-household  competition  for
resources  among  siblings  which  will  be  influenced  by  the  demographic  structure  of
households.  For example,  in many countries a child with more older siblings, especially elder
sisters  has  a  greater  chance  of going  to  school  and  lower  probability  of working.  The
presence  of older  siblings  relieves  the  child  from  work  responsibilities,  especially  in  the
unpaid  household sector.  Again,  as has been discussed before,  household  risk attitudes  may
also play  an important  part  in  selective  discrimination  in  the  intra-household  allocation  of
educational  resources.  Some poor households may send some children to work and others to
school as part of household portfolio diversification.
The  labor force participation  of children  in developing  countries is not incompatible
with  schooling  (though  it  may  affect  the  quantity  and  quality  of  learning).  Many  child
10laborers  also attend  school and the category of children who combine work and schooling is
in many cases a very important one.  Not only because  often for children who combine work
with  schooling,  work  is necessary  for  the  children  to pay  for  their  own  and/or  siblings'
education.  To what extent children are able to combine work with schooling - without undue
adverse effects  on human capital accumulation - will depend upon the types of activities they
are engaged  in. The combination of work and schooling is now being advocated by scholars
and  activists  as  an  intermediate  step  in  the  policy  program  of reducing  and  ultimately
eliminating  child  labor,  Grootaert  (1998).  Educational  expansion,  by  itself,  has  been
considered  an antidote to child labor, especially by policymakers.  However,  it has not been
as effective  in meeting  this goal although  increasing  greater  child participation  in schooling
activities is an important goal in its own right. Ravallion and Wodon (1999) show in the case
of Bangladesh  that  school  subsidies  lead  to  increased  school  enrollments  and  schooling
duration. However,  there is only a small  and less than proportionate  reduction in child labor.
The implication of this observation is that increased time devoted to schooling may come  out
of leisure instead of labor.  It may also lead to increased  labor participation of other children
in  the household  to make  up  for  lost labor  time. Much  more  analysis  needs  to be  done  to
understand  the  trade-offs  as  perceived  by  the  households  themselves  in  making  the
schooling-work decisions on behalf of their children.
Child  Labor and  Social and Cultural  Norms:
Economic  incentives  (or disincentives,  as case may be) apart,  attitudes towards  work
and schooling vary from  context to context  and influence  the relative  valuation of different
uses of a child's time which varies by gender and age. There are socially prescribed  roles for
boys and girls of different  ages - children  working long hours in the household or the farm
may be considered by the household,  the childiren themselves  and the community as normal
and part of 'growing  up"0, see Andvig, Canagarajah  and Kielland (2001)  for a discussion  in
an African context.
10 There  are interesting  exceptions - which may vary by income  and wealth levels of households.  For example,
very poor  households  may not be  able  to afford  to  follow  social  norms.  In  societies  where  women  working
outside the household  are disapproved of, women from the poorest households may do wage  work to maintain
family  subsistence.  As incomes  increase,  there  will be a move  towards  the  conservative  social  norms  where
women are secluded within the threshold of the household.
11Baland and Robinson (2000)  demonstrate  that even when parents  are altruistic,  child
labor can  arise  because  children  cannot  write credible  and  enforceable  contracts  with  their
parents  to  transfer  resources  to  them  in  the  future.  Parents  are  unable  to  capture  the  full
returns  from their investment  in children's education  and therefore underinvest in education,
relative  to  what  is  socially  optimal.  As  labor  and  schooling  exhaust  a  child's  time
endowment,  less schooling means more labor.
Child Labor and  Demand  Side Issues:
When  discussing child  labor,  it  should  be noted  that  only  a small  percentage  of all
child laborers  work  for wages  in  the market  - most children  are unpaid  domestic  workers.
Nevertheless,  we  can  conceptualize  a  'child  labor  market'  in  either  case;  for  the  unpaid
domestic  sector,  we  can  consider  households  as  employers  of their  own  children."  The
demand side of the market when children are employed  for wages has not been as actively  or
deeply researched as  has been  the supply-side  (household)  factors that explain the  existence
of  child  labor.  Children  in  wage  work  are  found  mostly  in  the  informal  sector  in
manufacturing  and  services,  in  petty trading  and  other self-employment  activities  (and  as
domestics  in  households)  in  the  urban  areas.  In  rural  areas,  children  may  work  as  hired
laborers for wages  or in-kind  compensation. However,  in the rural areas  of most developing
countries,  children work as unpaid workers on family farms or in household chores.
Assumptions  about  the  labor  market  in  general  and  the  child  labor  market  in
particular  are of crucial  importance  for both a better understanding  of the phenomenon  and
the  ensuing  policy-implications.  For  example,  the  existence  of well  behaved  (child)  labor
markets  may  be  a more  appropriate  assumption  in  some  contexts  than  in  others.  Also,  in
some  cases,  the  child  labor  market  may  be  monopsonistic  or  otherwise  segmented  for
demand-driven  reasons,  Chandrasekhar  (1997),  Grootaert and Kanbur (1995).  The structure
of the demand  for labor  in general  and  for child labor in particular  will also depend  on the
nature of the technology being used in the industry/market  in question.
In some industries  such as carpet  weaving,  bangle-making,  matches and mining, it is
deemed that children  are  employed in large numbers  because  of their  greater suitability  for
the tasks at hand, the so called 'nimble fingers'  argument. The argument is that children have
1 Practically,  the latter is hard to operationalize  because  children contribute  to domestic  chores as part of their
'socialization'  and effort in this sphere will be considered  as child labor if it crosses some critical limit.
12irreplaceable  skills  and  cannot  be  substituted  by  adult  labor  as  far  as  these industries  are
concerned.12 On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  shown  for  some  industries  where  a  heavy
concentration of child labor is found that employing children is only marginally profitable  for
firms,  Burra (1994).  They can easily switch to adult labor and pass  on the increased  cost to
customers  without  hurting  profits.  Why,  then,  is  there  a  demand  for  child  labor  in  these
industries?  Firms employ  children  not only  for their better suitability  for  certain  tasks but
also  for their lower reservation  wages,  and  for non-pecuniary  reasons  such as their  lack of
organized bargaining power.  Finns incur certain fixed costs in hiring and training a given set
of workers  apart  from  the  variable  costs  paid  out  as  wages,  Oi  (1996).  By hiring  child
laborers,  firms  economize  on these  fixed costs.)3 However,  it may also  be the  case that  by
employing  child laborers,  employers  increase their bargaining power over adult laborers.  So,
again, whether child labor is a substitute or a complement  to adult labor is open for debate.
Plausibly,  children  and  adults  are  substitutes  in some  types  of activities  and  not  in
others.  Nevertheless,  the child labor  market cannot be discussed  in isolation  from  the adult
labor market.  In fact,  the nature of the interrelationship  is important for analyzing  the impact
of macroeconomic  reforms on the nature  and incidence of child labor. To the contention that
child  labor  displaces  adult  labor  and/or  child  labor  is  associated  with  high  adult
unemployment  and  underemployment  must  be juxtaposed  on  the  observation  that  a high
child participation  rate is found both in high and low adult participation rates  scenarios.  The
combination  varies  from context to context. Child  and adult labor interact in complex  ways
both from the demand and supply sides.  For example,  Skoufias  (1993)  finds that in India,  a
rise in female wage rates increases a child's laboring time. Levy (1985)  finds the opposite  in
Egypt.  In the first case,  the substitution  effect outweighs  the income effect and vice versa in
the second case.  The difference  in outcomes  in the two contexts requires  deeper analysis of
underlying  conditions  for  better  understanding  the  dynamics  of  incentives,  institutions,
resources  and values  at work.  The child  labor market  is embedded  in larger social realities
which  may  have  significant  influence  on  its nature.  In  developing  economies,  very  often
social  institutions interact with market institutions to produce different kinds of labor market
segments.  For example,  gender  casting  of work,  which  exist in most societies.  A different
12 These industries are also often important in the country's exports.
13 In fact, in some industries, in the first few months when children are undergoing  'apprenticeship',  they are not
even paid, Burra (1994).
13example  is  the caste  system  in  India,  which  has been  a basis  for  occupational  choice  and
division of labor  both within  and  outside  the  household.  Externally,  it may  be used  as  a
rationing device in a demand constrained child labor market.14
In  the  case  of children  working  in  the  unpaid  domestic  sector,  we  can  think  of
households  as employers  of their  own  children.  The  demand  for  labor  depends  upon  the
household production  function both for household consumption  and  for sale in the market.  If
an external  market  for child labor exists, then  the opportunity  cost of a child's time will be
the  market  child  wage.  If not,  but  if instead  the  child  substitutes  for  adult  members  in
household  chores,  then the  opportunity  cost  of a child's time  will be  the market  wages  for
adults.  It  is  unlikely  that  perfect  markets  exist  for  all  household  goods  demanded  and
supplied by households  so separation  of production  decisions  from preference  parameters is
implausible.  The  household  maximization  problem  endogenously  determines  the  shadow
prices  of household  goods  and  shadow  wages  of household  labor  along  with  household
equilibrium in the demand and supply of household commodities  and factors of  production.15
On  a  cautious  note,  the  analogy  of the  presence  of implicit  markets  within  the
household  is useful but  has to  be interpreted  with  caution.  These markets  are  far from  the
perfectly  competitive markets  we find in theory and not even  close to the kinds of markets
found in the  real world.  What is exchanged  and  at what  price when children  do household
work  is  not  at  all  clear.  Work  within  households  have  elements  of both  coercion  and
cooperation  and it is not easy (if not impossible) to disentangle the two.
Child Labor  and Household  Decision  Making:
Anthropological  and  sociological  studies  document  household  structures  found  in
various  parts  of the  world which  are  significantly  different  from the common  preferences
model,  with or without production.  The common preferences,  or unitary, model assumes  the
existence of an aggregate  utility function  for the  household  and members  pool income  and
labor supply.  It does not take account of conflicts of interests between individual members of
the  same  household  that  may  have  an  important  bearing  on  how  resources  and
responsibilities  are allocated  within the household.  Hoddinott and Haddad (1995)  show how
14 This may be true even in the allocation of scarce schooling resources.
is This  too  may  be  problematic  to  disentangle  as  the  production  technology  for  household  goods  is
unobservable.
14incomes earned by women have a different effect on the allocation of household  expenditures
compared to incomes earned by men.
Given  the shortcomings  of the common  preferences/unitary  model,  researchers  have
used  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  bargaining  models  of households  in  recent  years  to
analyze  the  issues  of intra-household  resource  allocation,  see,  for  example,  McElroy  and
Homey (1981),  Lundberg and Pollak (1994).  In many cases,  the income pooling assumption
of the common preferences  model has been decisively  rejected.  Furthermore,  these analyses
show that the identity of members inside households  and the dynamics between them matter
for  the  household's  economic  decisions.  Therefore,  without  adequate  regard  for  the
appropriateness  of the  household  model being  used  in  a  given  context,  inappropriate  and
consequently harmful policy actions may be taken based on an incomplete  analysis.
Collective models  overcome important shortcomings  of the common preferences  and
unitary  models of the  household  and their  econometric  counterparts  prove  that  individual
preferences  and  endowments  matter in intra-household  processes.  However,  they too  leave
some  questions  unanswered.  These  models  generally  assume  that  whatever be  the  sharing
rules within households,  outcomes  are Pareto-efficient.  Work by for example Udry  (1994),
on the other hand, show that Pareto-efficiency  cannot be assumed but needs to be tested. This
work  finds  evidence  against  Pareto-efficiency  in  intra-household  allocation  processes.  In
order to analyze the welfare economics of child labor, especially in domestic work, a possible
approach  could  be  to  test  for  the  efficiency  properties  of allocation  of labor  and  other
resources  between  adults  and  children  of  different  age  and  gender.  Existing  studies,
moreover,  do  not so far include  children  as potential decision-makers  even though  as  child
laborers they supply labor and earn income. Children are assumed  to be public goods for the
households and only adult decision-makers are analyzed.  There is  some evidence suggesting
children who contribute  to household  income acquire some influence in household  decisions
and in the allocation of expenditures/resources.
4.  Economic  Model and Econometric Methodology
In this section,  we formalize  the ideas laid out in the previous  section by presenting
the  economic  model underlying  the  econometric  analysis.  Then  follows  a discussion of the
econometric  methodology  applied  in  this  paper,  i.e.,  how  to  move  from  the  theoretical
economic model to an econometrically  estimable model.
15Economic Model:
We  will  now  describe  the  economic  model  of  the  household  decision  process
regarding  children's  time  allocation  that  underlies  the  econometric  analysis  in  the  next
section.  First,  the objective  of the household  decision maker'6 needs  to be made  explicit.  It
seems  reasonable  that  the  objective  is  to  maximize  utility of adults  and  children  in  the
household  jointly  and,  further,  that  the  utility  of the  household  depends  on  aggregate
household  consumption'7, as well  as the child's schooling  and leisure.  This gives rise to the
following  household  utility  function  (for  simplicity  in  the  presentation,  we  assume  the
household only has one child but the results can readily be extended  to the general  case)):
ui = u'(Ci ,Li,Si ,Zi)  (4.1)
where  C is the aggregate aggregate  consumption,  and L and S denotes  leisure and schooling
of the child,  all of which are for household  i. It is assumed that u(.) is strictly quasi-concave
in  C, S and  L. Inclusion  of the vector  of exogenous  household  and  community variables  Z
allows for heterogeneity  across households. For example, the quality of and/or the distance to
local  schools  will  influence  the  parents'  expected  utility  from  sending  their  children  to
school.  Also,  it  allows  for  differences  in  tastes  due  to  ethnicity  and/or  religion  of the
household.
The maximization of (4.1)  is subject to the following constraint on the child's time:
T7= Si  +Li  +Hi  (4.2)
Where  T2,  total time available  to the child of household  i, may be  devoted to  schooling, 5,
leisure,  L,  or  wage  labor,  H.  The  maximization  of (4.1)  is  also  subject  to  the  household
budget constraint:
Cj = Wj Hi + ]Y,  (Zj  (4.3)
16 Or decision makers:  we allow for more than one  decision maker - in the extreme  case,  we could think of a
collective  decision process.  However, smce our emphasis is on the empirical (reduced form) results, we will not
explicitly model this further.
11 In this model formulation,  we operate  with one cornposite good,  C. However, one may think about this as a
basket of all possible consumption goods.
16where  C,  W  and  H  denotes  consumption,  (child)  wages,  and  (child's)  hours  worked,
respectively.  Y denotes the income from all other sources than child labor, and is assumed to
be a function of Z, also  (which will include, for example,  the parents'  education,  occupation
and landholdings).
The household decision maker maximizes (4.1)  subject to (4.2)  and (4.3) with respect
to C, S, L and H, given  W, Z and T. We may combine the constraints  (4.2) and (4.3) into the
composite constraint:
C; + WjS;  + W;  Hi  = WjT;  + Y; (Z)  (4.4)
This is also denoted the "full income" budget constraint.  From (4.4) it follows explicitly that
W; is the price of schooling  to parents,  since this  is the rate at which they could "sell"  their
children's time at the (child)  labor market.
With  the  composite  constraint  (4.4),  the  optimization  problem  of the  household
decision maker is to maximize (4.1)  with respect to C, L and S subject to (4.4). This leads to
the first-order conditions:
u  (-)  _  1  (4.5)
U`  (.  W;
uc,(.)  _1  (4.6)
uI.(.  W,
which  simply  state  that the  household  decision  maker will  equalize  the marginal  rates  of
substitution  between  consumption  and  schooling  and  consumption  and  leisure  with  the
relative prices  (where the price of consumption has been normalized to one).
From the first order conditions we may then subsequently obtain the derived demand
functions  (as  perceived  by  the  household  decision  maker)  for  the  child's  schooling  and
leisure:
17Si  =  S(W,,  WVTi  + Y1(Zi), Zi)  (4.7)
Hi =  I(Wi, WiTi +  Yi(Z1), Z,)  (4.8)
Where  Si and  Hi are the decision variables  (schooling or work of child  in household  i),  and
the other variables are as before.
Econometric  Methodology:
In moving  to  an  estimable  model,  essentially we  are  after  an  empirical  counterpart  of the
economic model as given by equations  (4.7) and (4.8) above (noting that child labor supply is
merely  the "dual"  of the demand  for leisure  function,  (4.8)). There  are several possibilities
here. Previously, the literature that has regarded schooling and child labor a joint decision has
applied either (1)  a bivariate probit, thus simultaneously estimating  a probit for the schooling
decision  and  one  for  the work  decision  in  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  structure;  see,
e.g.,  Canagarajah  and  Coulombe  (1997)  and Nielsen  (1998)),  or (2) a multinomial  logit  for
the four possible outcomes (school,  no work),  (school, work), (no school, work),  (no school,
no  work);  see,  e.g.,  Grootaert  (1998).  Both  models  may  be  justified  in  terms  of  our
objectives,  since  both  models  are  applicable  in  cases,  where  there  are  multiple  outcomes
(although  the  bivariate  probit  requires  exactly  four  outcomes  to  be  applicable,  which,
however we have  here,  namely the four different  activities  of children),  which  do not  lend
themselves  to  a  natural  ranking,  Greene  (2000).  However,  we  apply  a  multinomial  logit
model  due to  the marginal  probabilities  being computationally  easier to obtain,  see  Greene
(2000) for details.  Our dependent variable is the categorical indicator variable:
1  if childi neither attends school nor works
2 if child i only attends school
Yi  3 if child i both attends school and works
4 if child i only works
18The log-likelihood for the multinomial  logit model is:
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Prob(Y= j)  = - ,  (4.10)
1+Ze  XI
k=1
where  Y is  the  dependent  variable  (activity  of the  child),  subscript j  denotes  the  possible
outcomes  of the  dependent  variable  (school, work,  both or neither)  and  subscript  i denotes
the individual. xi is the vector of explanatory  variables  for individual  i, while fi is the vector
of parameters.
An important issue in analyzing the link between poverty and child labor by means of
estimating the economic model,  as given by the equations  (4.7) and (4.8)  above which needs
to be  addressed,  is  the  problem of potential  endogeneity/simultaneity.  This  problem  arises
whenever  one  or  more  of  the  explanatory  (i.e.,  "right-hand-side")  variables  are  not
exogenous  to the  dependent  (i.e.,  "left-hand-side")  variable.  In the  present case,  household
expenditure  may not be exogenous to the activity of the child,  in the sense that, for example,
a  relatively  high  household  expenditure  per  capita,  which  would  seem  to  imply  that  the
household is wealthy,  could be expected to induce the household not to send their children to
work.  However,  it  could  also  be  that  households  are  able  to  sustain  a  relatively  high
household  expenditure  per capita  because they  send their  children  to work.  Whenever  this
problem  is  present,  it  may  lead  to  biased  estimates  also  on  the  estimates  of the  other
parameters of the model, i.e.  for variables which are themselves  exogenous to the dependent
variable.
One solution of this is to apply instrument variable estimation techniques. However, it
is hard - if not impossible - to come up with an instrument for household expenditure  that is
not  correlated  with  the  child  activities  (which  is required  for  the  instrument  to be  valid).
However,  since one of the worst consequences of endogeneity is invalid paramneter  estimates
for the  other variables,  i.e.  other than  the potentially  endogenous  explanatory  variable,  one
19way of checking  whether severe  endogeneity bias is present is to run the models without the
potentially endogenous explanatory variable (here, per capita expenditure).
The  results  from  this  exercise  reveals  that  the  parameter  estimates  (and,  most
importantly,  their signs) are fairly robust to omitting (or, similarly, including) this variable,  in
turn  indicating  the  absence  of serious  endogeneity  bias  from  the  expenditure  variable.  In
addition,  one may  claim that due to the expenditure  variable being defined  as expenditures
for the past year, while the labor-  and schooling variables  are defined  as activities during the
past week,  there is  such a marginal  overlap  that the expenditure  variable may be said to be
endogenous  to the labor supply/schooling  choice by construction  - or, at the very least, pre-
determined.  In  any case,  combining  this  argument with the somewhat  informal  test of the
practical  consequences  or  otherwise  of the  potential  endogeneity/simultaneity  discussed
above,  it appears valid to claim  that there are  no severe  endogeneity/  simultaneity problems,
at least  for  practicalpurposes.
5.  Descriptive Analysis  and Presentation of the Ghanaian Economy'8
Ghana  has  undergone  wide-ranging  economic  reforms  from  the  mid  1980s  onwards.  The
core  of the  reforms  have  been  to  gear  the  economy  towards  greater  market  orientation.
Transitions  are mixed blessings  for the poorer households  in any country as  some of them
may  experience  short-term  welfare  losses  though  ultimately  benefit  in  the  long  run.  The
naYve view that secular changes in the economy will equally affect  all population groups and
sub-groups  has  been  discarded,  and  it  has  been  recognized  that  structural  adjustment
programs  may benefit  some  groups  and  hurt  others,  at  least  in the  short  run,  Demery and
Addison  (1993),  Demery and  Squire (1995).  Hence,  it  is important  to  study the impact  of
reforms,  in particular  whether and  how it affects  different  groups differently.  Such analysis
will enable policymakers to design and implement more effective programs in the future.
For our present  study  we  use  three  rounds  of the  Ghana  Living  Standards  Survey
(GLSS).  The  Living  Standards  Surveys  are  multipurpose  household  surveys,  that  are
nationally representative,  and collect information on a vast array of socioeconomic  variables
characterizing  households  and  their welfare.  The  rounds  used  in this  study  are the  Ghana
Living  Standards  Survey  1987/88  (GLSS1),  1991/92  (GLSS3),  and  1998/99  (GLSS4),
'  The macro economnic indicators quoted in this section are from Alderman (1994).  See also World Bank (1993,
1995 a,b).
20respectively.  Economic reforms were undertaken in Ghana, starting with the ERP in 1983. At
a  crude  level,  then,  the GLSS1  will reflect  short term  effects  of economic  reforms  and the
GLSS3  the medium to longer term effects, while the GLSS4 will reflect long term  effects of
economic reforms.
Ghana's Macroeconomy and Economic Reforms:  By  1983,  Ghana's  economy  had
more or less  collapsed.  Between  1970-80,  Ghana's  growth rate had fallen  by an average  of
1.5  percent  per annum.  Inflation  averaged  66 percent,  with wide  year to  year fluctuations.
Cocoa  production,  which  dominated  both  export  earnings  and  government  revenues,
continued  to  decline  due to  distortions  induced  by trade and exchange  rate restrictions  that
had been practiced for decades.  Domestically also, basic institutions had stopped functioning
as had most of the public infrastructure.
Moreover,  1983  was  also  the  year  of  multiple  exogenous  shocks  - the  country
experienced  one of the worst droughts  in its history,  the sharp decline in world cocoa  prices
continued,  and a million Ghanaians and their families were forced to return from neighboring
Nigeria  adding  to  the  country's  welfare  burdens.  The  wide  ranging  Economic  Reform
Program (ERP) was undertaken in 1983  in Ghana with the major aims of restoring  economic
growth and making the economy more market oriented. Ghana initiated its economic reforms
with stabilization  and  trade liberalization,  including  fiscal  and monetary  restraints,  phasing
out of quantitative  restrictions  and tariffs on imports and foreign exchange  liberalization  and
removal  of domestic  price distortions.  Agricultural  sector reforms  were undertaken  towards
the end of the  1980s with the major aim of reducing and removing the biases and distortions
in the rural sector.
Ghana had  seen significant  and continuing  decline in the production  of cocoa  from
the mid  1950s  onwards  when  it produced  more than 30  percent of the world's  cocoa.  The
failure  of the state Cocoa  marketing  board  in  giving a  higher share of the  market  value  of
cocoa to farmers resulted in smuggling to neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and subsequently lack of
incentive to produce leading to a declining share in the world markets. Most of the reform in
this sector  focused on removing price  distortions in order to improve production incentives
for  farmers.  It was  expected  that as  a result  of the  latter,  rural  farm  and  non-farm  growth
would  increase,  leading  to  an  overall  reduction  in  poverty.  Ghana  implemented  market
determined  exchange  rates, reductions  in import tariffs and export taxes, divestiture of state
21enterprises  and  removal  of agricultural  input  subsidies  to  enhance  incentives  for  greater
production and incomes in the rural sector.
The Impact of Economic Reforms on Child Labor: Economic  reforms in Ghana  were
initiated in  1983,  and reform of the agricultural  sector was  undertaken  later towards the end
of the 1980s. By many counts, economic reforms  in Ghana have been successful.  The growth
rates  of GNP  and  GNP per capita  have  been positive every  year between  1983-1993.  The
agriculture,  industry  and  service  sectors,  which  had  registered  declining  growth  prior  to
reforms,  grew at positive rates from 1984 onwards.
These  macroeconomic  developments just described - as well  as their possible effects
on micro-level economic behavior - are likely to be visible at the micro level, too, as captured
by the household surveys applied in this study. Tables Bl and B2 in Appendix B describe  the
typical  characteristics  of male and  female  child  laborers  in  the  years  1987/88  and  1991/92
respectively. 19 Tables  B3  and  B4  in  Appendix  B  describe  schooling  and  labor  force
participation  decisions by gender,  age and income quintile of the households of the children
in the two survey years, respectively.  The age group being considered  is children  between 7
and  14  years.  Although  a  child may  start work  from  when he  or she  is  4-5  years old,  the
Ghana Living Standards Survey uses age 7 as the cutoff for recording work  activities.
The mean ages of male and female child laborers  in both rural and urban areas in the
two years have remained more or less constant around  11  years. The proportion of rural child
workers,  both  male  and  female,  have  increased  substantially between  1988  and  1992,  from
33.4  percent  to  49.1  percent  for  boys  and  from  25.2  percent  to  41.2  percent  for  girls,
respectively.  More girls have entered  the labor  market than boys  in the interim  time period.
The proportion of child workers in the labor force, both male and female,  too have increased
although the average number of hours spent in the labor market have decreased substantially.
When  we compare  and  contrast the  schooling  activities of male  and  female children  in the
two years,  we  can  see  from  Tables  BI  and  B3, that school  participation  has  increased  for
both boys and girls, though less  for girls than for boys.  Nevertheless,  on average,  28 percent
19  We  do not  present  figures  from  the  1997  survey  due to  missing  observations  on  key  variables,  leading to
extremely  small samples  which,  in turn,  would  lead to unreliable  conclusions.  In particular,  the final effective
sample of children between the ages 7-14 is only 443 -as comnpared to  1732 and 3516 children in the two earlier
samples - of which only around 1 percent are in the two categories "only work" and "neither attends school, nor
works".  In  turn,  this  renders  application  of a multinomial  logit  invalid and  we  will  apply a binomial  probit
model instead (we return to this issue in more detail later,  in the econometric  analysis section).
22of children between  7-14 years of age are out of the school system. From Tables B2 and B4,
we find that the percentage of both boys and girls in the work only category have declined in
1991/92  from  1987/88,  and  that  in the  categories  school  only  and work  and  school  have
increased.  While  this is  generally true  for all  income  categories,  the  largest increases  have
come in the two highest  - 4h and 5h - quintiles.
The incidence of child labor and child schooling is believed  to be strongly positively
related to the level of household income - this is the so called 'poverty hypothesis'  for child
labor discussed  above. Simply put, a decline in poverty can be expected to be associated with
a decline in child labor and an increase  in child  schooling. Between  1988  and  1992, poverty
in  Ghana declined  from 37 percent  to  31  percent  as implied by the measures of depth  and
severity of poverty. This decline in poverty came entirely from the rural areas and some from
urban areas other than the capital city Accra. Accra registered  a triple fold increase  in poverty
- from 8.6 percent to 23 percent. Comparing the composition  of child workers between rural
and urban  areas in the two years  from Tables Bl  and B4, we find child labor in urban areas
being  more  or  less  constant,  while  we  see  a  substantial  increase  in  rural  child  labor  in
1991/92. From the point of view of the poverty hypothesis  as it relates to child labor, this is
puzzling  given  that  rural.poverty  declined  and urban  poverty  increased  in the  years  under
consideration.  Also we must  be mindful  of the fact  that these  inferences  are  being  drawn
from  simple  cross-tabulations.  Given the joint causation  of different household  behavioral
outcomes,  identification of cause and effect is not possible without a regression analysis with
multiple controls.  We will do this in section 5.
Comparing  the  results  from  the  household  surveys  with  the  macroeconomic
indicators20 reveals  that  the  (macroeconomic)  growth  period  from  1983  onwards  was
punctuated  with decline  in  1987 and  1988. Real minimum  wages  and average real  monthly
income from agriculture  also  fell substantially.  World cocoa  prices fell substantially  during
the  adjustment  period  in  1986.  Agriculture  has  experienced  very  slow  growth  in  spite  of
reform measures being taken. We can expect these circumstances to strengthen incentives for
greater use of child  labor in the years  1987/88 by households.  In contrast,  child  schooling
decisions  are  more  appropriately  based  on  long  tenn/permanent  income  factors  of
households,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  investment,  being  a  long-term  (human  capital)
20 From Alderman (1994).
23investment.  Between  1987/88  and  1991/92,  among  all  child  laborers,  those  employed  in
agriculture increased substantially - from 67.5 percent to 96.3 percent for boys and from 67.9
percent to 88.5 percent  for girls.  It should also be noted that the agricultural  sector continues
to  account  for more  than 40 percent  of Ghana's  GDP.  The  majority of the poor  in  Ghana,
around  70  percent,  live  in rural  areas  with  agriculture  and  allied  activities  as  their  main
occupation.  In  Ghana,  as  in  much  of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  most  agriculture  is based  on
production  in  small  family  farms.  Generally,  households  are  large,  while  landholdings  are
small. In  1988,  small landholders  constituted 94 percent of the rural population.  Agricultural
wage  labor is  a small minority and  a  seasonal  phenomenon.  Moreover,  child labor  in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa is a rural and family-based  phenomenon.  This is in contrast with the kind of
child labor  found  in Latin America,  where most child labor is found in wage work in urban
areas.
Generally,  these preliminary  results lends  some  support to the hypotheses  carved out
in  the  introduction  of this  paper,  child  labor  and  schooling  responding  primarily  in  the
medium  to  long  run.  Less  children  engage  primarily  in  child  labor  and  more  children
primarily in  schooling in the  later sample  (medium-  to long run) than  in the earlier sample
(short  run).  More  children  are  combining  the  two  activities  in the later  sample  than  in the
earlier.  This  is true  of both  genders,  all  ages  and  income  quintiles.  There  seems  to  be  a
complex  of demand  and  supply  side  factors  at  work  here.  Certainly,  the  relation  between
income  levels and child labor is neither simple nor straightforward.  However,  these tentative
conclusions  needs  to  be substantiated  in  a multivariate  regression  analysis,  where we take
multiple factors into account.
6.  Econometric Analysis  of Child Labor and Schooling  Determinants and Dynamics
We now move to the econometric  analysis. Due to the amount of estimates, we will
discuss only the major results - and focus  mainly on the activities "school  only" and  "work
only" - and refer to the tables in Appendix C for the details.
The results from the full sample for GLSS1  and 3 in Tables Cl  and C2 in Appendix  C
reveal  substantial  differences  between the two periods.  In the  earlier  sample,  older children
tend  to be less  likely to  go to  school and more likely to work,  ceteris paribus  (the marginal
effects  are  around  11  and  16  percent,  respectively).  This result is in line with a perception
that  the  marginal  product,  and  hence,  the  labor-value  of the  child,  rises  with  age,  hence
24leading to older children being relatively more likely to work and less likely to attend school.
The  latter  indicates  the  existence  of inter-generational  spill-over  effects  in  education,  or,
similarly, a great deal of persistence in education at the household level.
The next striking result is  that children  that are biologically related  to the household
are more  likely to attend  school, while  at the  same time less likely to work,  pointing to the
possible  importance  of so called  "placed  children",  a phenomenon  which  is well-known  in
the  next-to-neighboring  country  of Benin,  Kielland  (1999).21  Interestingly,  the  mother's
education does not seem  to be affecting the activity of children,  while the father's education
has a consistently adverse effect on child labor across  all levels of education (no education  is
the reference  category),  while education of the father promotes  the education of the child, as
well.
Household  composition  proves  to be  an important  factor.  In particular,  the presence
of brothers  and  sisters between  7  and  14  years  of age enhances  the likelihood  of attending
school (by around 4 and 6 percent, respectively),  in line with previous research,  for example
Nielsen (1998).  Traditions seem important,  as revealed by the statistical  significance of some
of the  religious  variables.  Coming  from  a  Catholic  or  Muslim  background  increases  the
likelihood  of attending school  (by around  17 and 25  percent,  respectively),  while  Catholics
are both less likely to only work and more likely to combine work and school (by around  16
and 5 percent, respectively).
The existing evidence  on the effect of the  gender of household head is mixed. In the
present context,  male headed households  seern  to  be more prone  to sending  their  children
working and less likely to send children to school (by around  10 and 5 percent, respectively)
relative to  female headed households.  Canagarajah  and Nielsen  (1999)  suggests that it may
work both ways,  since  it may be conjectured  that either female  heads may care more about
the children  and therefore  use less child labor.  On the other hand,  it may equally well be the
case that female heads may be forced to make use of child-labor more often because  they are
under economic pressure  due to being the sole  (adult)  breadwinner  in the household  due to
the husband being dead or having left either permanently or temporarily.
21 The number  of children,  which  have  a non-biological  relationship  to the  household  head is 444,  or a little
more than 25 percent of the sample.  Hence,  since this group is a substantial part of the sample,  this issue seems
to warrant further analysis.
25Our poverty measure,  (log of) household expenditures per capita, does not seem to be
important  except  in  the  work  only  equation.  Furthermore,  the  impact  is  small,  with  an
estimated  elasticity of about 0.05, implying that a 1 percent income increase increases  child
labor  with  5 percent.  This  apparently  counterintuitive  result  may  be  explained  by  it not
necessarily implying causality from poverty to child labor. Indeed,  it may be the case that the
households  are less poor, i.e.  can sustain a higher per capita consumption level  because they
engage in child labor.
Being  engaged in raising livestock adversely  affects the probability of only attending
school,  while it increases  the probability of only engaging  in child labor (by around  14 and
12 percent,  respectively).  This points to the importance of child labor as a rural phenomenon,
as does also  the  fact that the regional  variables  are significant  and positive  in the schooling
only equation  for Accra and urban areas  outside Accra, while negative  for the rural coastal
region.  Also,  in the  work  only  equation  the  regional  variables  for Accra  and urban  areas
outside Accra are statistically significant and negative.
Moving to the later sample from GLSS3  (1991/92), the results  from which are shown
in  Table  C2  in Appendix  C,  the  first  remarkable  thing  is that age no  longer  seems  to  be
important  for the  activity  choice,  since now  there is an  age  effect  only in the  equation  for
combined work  and schooling.  However,  this may reflect the fact that the older, the children
are,  the more  likely it is that they can engage  in both activities,  since  engaging  in physical
work and at the same time attending  school demands  a certain  maturity of the physique (this
variable was borderline  significant  in the GLSS1  sample).  The father's  education is, just as
was  the  case  for  GLSS1,  very important  for children's  activities:  the  father's  educational
attainrent consistently positively affects the tendency for a child to only attend school,  while
negatively  affecting  the  tendency  of a  child  to  only engage  in child  labor.  However,  the
mother's  education  now  also  comes  out  significant  in  the  case  of middle  secondary
education.  Household  composition  again  proves  important.  Children  with  a  Catholic,
Protestant  or other  Christian  background  are more  likely to  only attend  school  relative  to
children with and Animist/Traditional  religious  background.  However,  only children with a
Catholic  (and, marginally,  with a Muslim) background  are less likely to engage in child labor
(by 5 and 4 percent, respectively).
26Children from male headed household are, as was also the case for GLSS1, less likely
to  attend  school  only and more  likely to only  engage in child labor.  The  influence of labor
demand  variables  is  now massive,  as compared  to  GLSS1.  Both owning  land  and  owning
livestock  are  now  statistically  significant  variables  in  the  household  child labor/schooling
decision  process,  both affecting  the  probability of only attending  school  negatively,  while
affecting the probability of only working positively.  This contrasts  to GLSS1, where only the
livestock was important in the household decision process.  This points towards the existence
of asymmetries  in the  determinants  of child  labor over time,  something which is consistent
with out main hypothesis of there not being a linear relationship  between poverty and child
labor - indeed, other variables - including the household's  demand for labor - are part of and
jointly determines  the household's  child labor/schooling  decision. These results indicates the
increased  importance of labor demand of the household  as a determinant for child labor and,
thus, points towards the importance of the main conjecture of this paper of child labor being
a  multi-dimensional  concept,  components  of which include  - but  are not  limited  to  - the
household's  labor  demand  and  economic  activities  as  well  as  poverty/welfare  of the
household.  In  particular,  the  labor  demand  of the  household  (or  similarly,  the  economic
activities  of the household)  appear to have become  more important in the medium term  (as
revealed by GLLS3) than they appeared in the short term (as revealed by GLSS 1).
As  was  the  case  with  GLSS1,  the  importance  of child  labor  of mainly  a  rural
phenomenon is sustained by the results from GLSS3. People from urban areas  outside Accra
are  more likely  to only attend  school,  and  less  likely to work,  and  vice  versa  for children
from rural  coastal  and  rural  forest  areas.  Lastly,  the  importance  of household  welfare  as
measured by log  expenditure  per capita has changed.  In the GLSS1  sample,  there was only
an effect on the "work  only" decision, whereas  with the GLSS3  sample,  the importance  of
household welfare has shifted to the schooling only decision. The estimated marginal impact
is 0.06,  implying  that  a  1 percent  increase  in household  expenditure  per capita  increase  the
probability of a child only attending school by 6 percent. Again, this indicates the existence
of  substantial  non-linearities  in  the  relationship  between  poverty  and  child  labor.  In
particular,  this result suggests  that macro  economic  circumstances  - including  the massive
structural  adjustment  policies  which  have  taken  place  between  the  two  samples  - is  an
integral part of this relationship  and a major determinant of the underlying process  governing
27the  evolution  of child  labor  supply  and  child  labor  demand,  even  though  the  impact  is
modest.
Moving  to the GLSS4  sample,  the first thing to  note  is  that this part of the analysis
has  to  be  done applying  a binomial  response  model rather  than  the  multinomial  response
model applied previously.  It is essentially  a data problem,  in the sense that there are just too
few observations  in the "neither work, nor school"  and the "only work" categories  to validly
estimate  the  model  by  means  of  a  multinomial  logit  model.  To  be  specific,  as  earlier
mentioned, there are only five observations  in each of these groups, corresponding  to around
1 percent  of the sample,  in  effect  leaving  us with only two  groups  (i.e.,  "only  school"  and
"school  and  work").  Hence,  with  only  two  classes,  a  binomial  probit/logit  is  more
appropriate.  In addition,  the total number of observations is extremely  low, owing to  a high
dropout of the sample on the  question of whether the child has been working the past seven
days  or not  (implying  that the obtained  result,  discussed  in the  following,  should  be taken
with a grain of salt). The results from the binomial probit are shown in Table C3 in Appendix
C. Noting  that the reference  category is children that attends school  only, the results overall
appear fairly consistent with the previous results in several respects.
To  begin with,  being  a  child  of the household  negatively  affects  the probability  of
combining  work  and  school,  relatively  to  only  attending  school.  In  accordance  with  the
earlier  results,  having  a sister between  the  ages  7  and  14  also  decreases  the  likelihood  of
having to work  in addition  to attending school, implying some substitutability  in child labor
within the household.  Similarly,  the locational  variables confirm that  child labor is still very
much a rural phenomenon,  also in this more recent  sample.  However,  now smaller  siblings
proves important in the sense that they increase the likelihood of combining work and school,
relative  to  only  attending  school,  while  children  from  both  religious  and  non-religious
backgrounds  are  less likely  to  combine work  and school  (hence  more likely to  only attend
school)  than are  children from households  with a traditional  (animist) religious background.
This points to the importance of traditions and customs as an important  determinant of child
labor.
There seems to be a poverty-child  labor link present in this more recent sample,  also.
In  particular,  its  importance  has  switched  in  this later  sample,  such that  it now  affects  the
decision of combination  of school and child labor activities relative to only attending school.
28The  parameter  estimate  is  -0.02,  implying  that  a  1 percentage  point  increase  in  per capita
expenditure  will lead  to a decrease  in the probability  of engaging  in child  labor (combined
with school) of 2 percent, ceteris paribus.
With  the caveat  of the  effective  (sub-)  samples being  quite  small  in mind,  we now
turn to the predictions of the models, which are shown in Tables DI  and D2 in Appendix D.
First, we note that  there has been  a dramatic  decrease  in the predicted probabilities  of only
working and an increase in the proportion of children that combine  school and work both for
the full sample  as well as  across  the various  sub-samples, controlling  simultaneously  for the
various factors hypothesized too influence this decision while the proportion that only attends
school has remained stable and/or decreased, depending on the (sub-) sample and year.  These
developments  support  the  tentative  conclusions  based  on  simple  cross-tabulations  in  the
descriptive  analysis.  Hence,  even  when  taking  into  account  all  possible  influences
simultaneously  may  we  conclude  that  some  support  exist  for the  conjectures  made  in  the
introduction of this paper,  namely that  child labor and  schooling is likely not to respond  in
the short  run, while it will respond in the long run - and with opposite  sign: child labor will
decrease  and  schooling  will  increase,  once  the  effects  form  economic  reforms  materialize
and/or  become  credible.  Further,  again,  the importance  of parents'  education  on children's
activities  is very significant.  Children,  whose mother and/or father have  no education  are less
likely to only attend school  and more likely to only engage in child labor activities than  is the
sample  as  a  whole.  This  is  true  for  both  the  GLSS1  and  the  GLSS3  (we  do  not  make
predictions for GLSS4 due to the low number of observations,  as earlier mentioned).
Lastly,  while  there  generally  is  no  strong  pattem  in  the  impact  from  poverty  as
measured by the expenditure  quintile of the household, there is a strong positive link between
attending  school only and poverty  of the household,  such that the poorer the household,  the
less likely it is that a child only attends school.
These results  are largely consistent with the "real"  developments,  as discussed in the
presentation  of the  descriptive  statistics  in section 4,  and,  thus,  indicates that  the  estimated
models capture  the features  of the data well.  So,  our main hypotheses  are  supported  in this
more rigorous multivariate  (regression)  framework.
297.  Summary and Conclusions
We analyze the determinants of child labor in Ghana,  focusing at the dynamics of child labor
in  the  short-,  medium  and  long  term,  in  particular  the  response  to  growth  and  economic
policy.  Previous  studies  of child  labor  and  its  determinants  have  mainly  been based  on  a
single  cross-section.  While  this  may provide  a useful  "snap-shot"  of child  labor  incidence
and determinants  at one point  in time,  we suggest that this approach  does  not satisfactorily
capture  the  multidimensional  character  of  child  labor.  In  particular,  the  question  of
asymmetries  in the incidence  and determinants of child labor across time seems to have been
seriously underdeveloped  in the existing  literature  on child  labor, thus  leading  to imprecise
conclusions  on  factors  influencing  child  labor  and,  in  turn,  offering  policy  choices,
sometimes  leading in the wrong direction  as far as the eradication of child labor is concerned.
To fill this void, we analyze  and compare the incidence,  determinants  and dynamics of child
labor in Ghana after a brief review of the inter-linkages between  economic  growth, economic
policy and child  labor and  the  literature  on child  labor and  household  decision theory  as it
relates to this paper.
Starting  from  a  premise  that the  simple  - direct  - relationship  between  poverty  and  child
labor, which has often been seen as the feature of child labor does not adequately capture the
multi  facetted  nature  of child  labor,  we  find  evidence  of asymmetries  in the  child  labor-
poverty  link,  as  well  as  quite  complex  dynamics  in  the  evolution  of child  labor  and  its
determinants over time.
In particular,  we find  evidence  of the poverty-child labor link - while clearly evident  in the
data  - changes  over time  in  the  case of Ghana,  in  the  short run  affecting  only  the  work
decision, while  in the longer run affecting  the schooling decision, only.  For the most recent
sample, GLSS4, the importance of the child-labor poverty link has switched,  such that it now
adversely  affects  the decision of combination  of school  and  child labor activities  relative  to
only  attending  school,  indicating  long-run  responsiveness  of  child  labor  to  policy
interventions.  Due  to  the  low  number of usable  observations  in  the  GLSS4,  however,  the
importance of the latter result should not be over-emphasized.
While  the  results  of  the  dynamic  responses  of child  labor  and  schooling  from  policy
interventions,  thus, are not clear-cut, they do suggest that the view of a simple, linear relation
is not valid  (or at  least,  only as  a  static  phenomenon)  and,  in particular,  do not adequately
30capture  the dynamic  evolution of child labor,  as it responds  to changes in the economic  and
political climate of the economy.
In addition  to these very dynamic findings  related to poverty,  most of our other main results
are  quite  robust  over  time.  In  particular,  we  confirm  evidence  from  earlier  studies  of  a
positive link between parents'  education  and the likelihood  of a child attending  school only,
and  similarly  a negative  link  between  parents'  education  and  the likelihood  of a child  only
working.  Household  composition  also proves  important,  in the sense of the results revealing
substitutability between the siblings within the household.
A main  result is  the existence of structural  differences  related to rural  areas  in Ghana,  both
coming through  the increased (child)  labor demand  from households engaged  in agriculture
and  livestock  raising,  as  well  as  regional  differences  among  Accra,  other urban  areas  and
rural Coastal and rural Forestal regions, the latter two generally exhibiting higher demand  for
child  labor  than  the  former.  Similarly,  the  likelihood  of only  attending  school  is  generally
found to be larger for urban areas than for rural areas.
Traditions  and  customs,  as  captured  by  the  religious  background  of  the  child  proves
important  as  a  determinant  of child  labor  and  schooling,  since  children  with  a  Christian,
Muslim or other religious background  are generally more  likely to only attend  school, while
less  likely  to  only  engage  in  child  labor,  relative  to  children  from  a  traditional/animist
religious  background.  This  results  points  towards  the  importance  of  other  than  purely
economic  factors being  crucial to increase our understanding  of child labor,  its  determinants
and its prevalence.
A  key  result  is  that  of the  incidence  of child  labor - both  actual  and  as  predicted  by  our
models,  introducing multiple  influences  of child  labor  and  schooling  - falling dramatically
over  time.  Additionally,  schooling  increases  over  time.  These  two  results  - being  largely
consistent  with the "real"  developments,  as discussed  in the  presentation of the descriptive
statistics  in  section 4 - thus  indicates  that the estimated models  capture the  features  of the
data well.  Hence,  even when  taking into account  all possible influences  simultaneously  may
we  conclude that some  support exist for the key conjectures  of this paper,  namely that child
labor and schooling is likely not to respond in the short run, while it will respond in the long
run - and with opposite signs: child labor will decrease and schooling will increase,  once the
effects  from  economic  reforms  materialize  and/or  become  credible.  In  the  short run,  child
31labor policies  may be  ineffective,  possibly even counterproductive,  since it takes some time
for the policy to have its full effect. A very clear example of this is the result that poverty has
no affect on the schooling decision in the short run, while it positively affects  the probability
of only attending school  in the  long run. We may interpret this result as  a certain  degree of
"sluggishness"  being  inherent  in  the  household  decision  process,  since  the  household
decision maker first has to believe  that the proposed  policy interventions  will truly be made
before she feels certain enough to act on them. Due to the high costs of schooling, both direct
and in the form of forgone earnings of the child, human capital investments  seem particularly
sensitive to policy announcements and to their credibility.
While this study attempted  to shed some light on the dynamics  of child labor and  its
determinants,  it is  a very  modest first  attempt to do so.  Much more remains  to be done.  In
particular,  we suggest that more attention be directed to the poverty-child  labor  link, as  the
present  study raises  serious doubts about the validity of this  link as merely a simple,  linear
relationship.  Also,  it would be  interesting  to  analyze whether  similar results hold for other
countries who have experienced marked  economic reforms.
Further, other factors than the traditional economic  factors needs to be analyzed more
in order to increase our understanding about  child labor and  its determinants.  These include,
but  are by no means  limited to,  intergenerational  spill-over  effects  in  education  as well  as
traditions  and customs as  revealed  by,  for example,  children's religious  background.  These
are all factors, the  inclusion of which  is crucial to  increase  our understanding of child labor
as  a  dynamic phenomenon,  an understanding  which is  absolutely crucial  to the  design  and
implementation of sound policy in this area in the future.
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37Appendix  A: Definition of Variables
Age  Age of individual
Age squared  Age of individual squared
Female  1 if female, 0 if male
Child of household  1 if child of household,  0 otherwise
Mother  lives in household  I if mother lives in household,  0 otherwise
Father lives in household  1 if father lives in household, 0 otherwise
Mother: None  1 if mother completed no education (reference  group)
Mother: Primary  1 if mother completed primary education
Mother: Middle secondary  1 if mother completed middle secondary education, 0 otherwise
Mother: Post middle secondary  1  if  mother  completed  some  post  middle  secondary  education,  0
otherwise
Father:  None  1 if father completed no education (reference  group)
Father: Primary  1 if father completed primary education
Father:  Middle secondary  1 if father completed middle secondary  education, 0 otherwise
Father:  Post middle secondary  I  if  father  completed  some  post  middle  secondary  education,  0
otherwise
Children 0-6 years  Number of children 0-6 years of age
Brothers 7-14 years  Number of brothers  7-14 years of age
Sister 7-14 years  Number of sisters 7-14 years of age
Males  15-59 years  Number of males  15-59 years of age
Females  15-59 years  Number of females  15-59 years of age
Older than 60  Number of individuals  older than 60 years of age
Anumist  1 if Animist/Traditional  religion, 0 otherwise  (reference  group)
Muslim  1 if Muslim, 0 otherwise
Catholic  1 if Catholic,  0 otherwise
Protestant  1 if Protestant,  0 otherwise
Other Christian  1 if other Christian, 0 otherwise
(Log) per capita expenditure  (Log) per capita expenditure
Male head of household  1 if male headed household,  0 otherwise
Age of head of household  Age  of head of household
Age of head of household squared  Age of head of household squared
Household owns livestock  1 if household owns livestock, 0 otherwise
Household owns land  I if household owns land, 0 otherwise
Schooling  expenditure  Total schooling expenditure
Distance (in minutes)  Distance to school (in minutes)
Rural Savannah  1 if individual is from Rural Savannah, 0 otherwise (reference group)
Accra  I if individual is from Accra, 0 otherwise
Urban areas outside Accra  1 if individual is from urban areas outside Accra,  0 otherwise
Rural Coastal  1 if individual is from Rural Coastal Region, 0 otherwise
Rural Forest  1 if individual is from Rural Forestal Region,  0 otherwise
38Appendix B:  Descriptive  Statistics
Table B1.  Typical Profile of a Child Worker in Ghana 1987/88
Variable  Male  Female
Average Age:
Urban  11.5  11.2
Rural  10.9  10.9
Child Worker Composition:
Urban  5.0  4.5
Rural  33.4  25.2
Proportion of child workers in labor force  11.6  9.0
Child Labor Force Participation Rate  17.6  13.6
Participation in Farming (percent)  67.5  67.9
Current School Participation (percent)  55.3  47.5
Contribution to total hours of participation  11.0  10.7
nationally
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Living Standards  Survey  1987/88
Table B2.  Joint Labor Force and School  Participation Rate (last 7 days)  in Ghana 1987/88, by
gender, age and expenditure quintiles
,.  ~  -,  .*Wdork'Only  SchoolfOily  Work &  None
Gender
Male  19.6  40.9  14.4  25.1
Female  18.6  38.1  9.4  33.9
Age
7  9.0  44.3  5.9  40.6
8  15.6  44.0  5.7  34.7
9  15.7  41.9  11.0  31.8
10  19.8  37.8  14.4  28.0
11  19.9  42.0  14.1  23.9
12  24.7  32.6  14.3  28.4
13  25.1  37.3  17.2  20.4
14  25.8  36.1  16.4  21.8
Expenditure Quintile
1  19.9  36.3  11.6  32.2
2  20.2  38.1  13.7  28.0
3  21.2  39.8  10.4  28.6
4  17.2  40.4  12.7  29.7
5  16.0  45.1  11.3  27.7
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Living Standards  Survey 1987/88
39Table B3.  Typical Profile of a Child Worker in Ghana 1991/92
Category  Male  Female
Average Age:
Urban  11.8  11.3
Rural  11.0  11.0
Child Worker Composition:
Urban  4.5  5.2
Rural  49.1  41.2
Proportion of child workers in labor force  14.0  10.0
Child Labor Force Participation Rate  29.3  26.7
Participation  in Farming (percent)  96.3  88.5
Current School Participation  76.7  68.3
Contribution  to total hours of participation nationally  5.4  5.3
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Living Standards  Survey  1991/92
Table B4.  Joint Labor Force and School  Participation Rate (last 7 days) in Ghana
1991/92, by gender, age and expenditure quintiles
:  Work Oniv  School  Only  Work &  None
__________ __________ ____  __  - -School
Gender
Male  9.2  56.6  20.1  14.1
Female  9.4  51.0  17.3  22.3
Age
7  4.7  56.2  7.4  31.7
8  6.7  59.1  11.4  22.8
9  6.1  57.5  17.0  19.4
10  8.8  55.2  20.2  15.9
11  8.2  56.3  23.6  11.9
12  11.5  51.3  22.6  14.6
13  14.0  46.1  28.3  11.6
14  16.4  47.1  24.3  12.2
Expenditure Quintile
1  13.1  46.4  15.5  24.9
2  6.8  54.1  21.7  17.3
3  10.5  53.8  18.6  17.1
4  8.7  55.2  19.2  17.0
5  5.7  64.6  19.1  10.6
Source: Calculations based on Ghana Living  Standards  Survey  1991/92
40Appendix C: Determinants of Child Labor and Schooling
Table Cl.  Determinants of Children's' Activities in Ghana, GLSS1
'_  *t;,-  ,  .Sho'o'onIy'l'  * X  -SchooVand  aWork  - Work only
-off..,  Std.error  e  Sd  Coeff.  Std.error
Individual characteristics:
Age  -0.113  0.060  0.057  0.036  0.162  0.048
Age squared  0.004  0.003  -0.002  0.002  -0.006  0.002
Female  -0.035  0.026  -0.043  0.015  -0.016  0.020
Child of household  0.126  0.055  0.014  0.029  -0.074  0.042
Parent  characteristics:
Mother lives in household  -0.046  0.037  -0.042  0.020  -0.007  0.028
Father lives in household  -0.034  0.046  -0.014  0.026  0.047  0.037
Mother: Primary  -0.041  0.050  -0.019  0.028  -0.015  0.046
Mother: Middle secondary  0.033  0.043  -0.042  0.027  -0.016  0.037
Mother: Post riddle  secondary  0.114  0.125  -0.120  0.112  0.212  0.097
Father: Primary  0.277  0.051  -0.022  0.037  -0.087  0.047
Father: Middle secondary  0.147  0.034  0.039  0.020  -0.091  0.028
Father: Post middle secondary  0.127  0.055  0.049  0.029  -0.125  0.047
Household Characteristics:
Children 0-6 years  -0.005  0.009  0.006  0.005  0.011  0.008
Brothers 7-14  years  0.043  0.017  -0.002  0.009  -0.008  0.013
Sister 7-14 years  0.058  0.020  0.010  0.011  -0.011  0.017
Males  15-59 years  0.004  0.012  -0.022  0.007  -0.009  0.011
Females  15-59 years  0.012  0.013  0.018  0.007  -0.003  0.010
Older than  60  -0.022  0.030  -0.036  0.016  -0.023  0.022
Muslim  0.169  0.050  -0.014  0.039  -0.001  0.047
Catholic  0.254  0.054  0.048  0.027  -0.158  0.056
Protestant  -0.048  0.054  0.111  0.024  -0.022  0.045
Other Christian  -0.016  0.059  0.056  0.029  -0.090  0.056
(Log) per capita expenditure  -0.014  0.026  0.001  0.016  0.048  0.020
Male  head of household  -0.096  0.032  0.046  0.019  0.047  0.027
Age of head of household  -0.012  0.005  -0.003  0.003  0.003  0.004
Age of head of household squared  0.000  5.71E-05  5.09E-05  0.000  -2.9E-05  4.64E-05
Household  owns livestock  -0.140  0.089  -0.045  0.053  0.118  0.049
Household  owns land  -0.024  0.039  -0.017  0.021  -0.003  0.032
Cost of  Schooling:
Schooling expenditure  -3.69E-07  7.61E..06  9.39E-06  4.04E-06  -7.45E-06  6.23E-06
Distance (in minutes)  -5.lE-05  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001
Location:
Accra  4.628  0.222  -2.679  0.204  -5.456  0.238
Urban areas outside Accra  0.088  0.042  -0.016  0.029  -0.195  0.038
Rural Coastal  -0.090  0.044  -0.005  0.028  0.045  0.032
Rural Forest  0.005  0.035  0.004  0.020  -0.034  0.026
Constant  1.205  0.431  -0.495  0.257  -1.476  0.347
Notes: The  coefficients  are  marginal  probabilities.  Number of observations  =  1732; Wald  )?(102) = 7679.67;
Prob > x2  = 0.000; Log likelihood  = -2073.911;  Pseudo-R2 = 0.107.  Bold:  Statistically significant at 5 percent;
underline:  Statistically significant  at  10 percent; cursive: Statistically  significant  at  15 percent;  standard errors
are robust Huber-White Sandwich standard  errors, White (1980).
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- -,  - -*  - -School  only  ,  School  and Work  Work only
Coeff.-  Sld.error  Coeff.  Std.error  Coeff.  Std.error
Individual characteristics:
Age  -0.052  0.041  0.165  0.030  0.050  0.034
Age squared  0.002  0.002  -0.007  0.001  -0.001  0.002
Female  -0.038  0.018  -0.012  0.012  -0.020  0.014
Child of household  -0.029  0.042  0.013  0.026  0.092  0.034
Parent  characteristics:
Mother lives in household  -0.091  0.029  -0.020  0.019  0.050  0.025
Father  lives in household  0.145  0.037  -0.045  0.023  -0.174  0.028
Mother: Primary  0.0S0  0.032  -0.001  0.021  0.021  0.028
Mother: Middle secondary  0.064  0.030  0.027  0.020  2.19E-05  0.028
Mother Post rniddle secondary  -0.019  0.093  -0.075  0.072  -0.126  0.104
Father:  Primary  0.090  0.036  0.032  0.023  -0.059  0.031
Father:  Middle secondary  0.066  0.025  0.018  0.016  -0.048  0.020
Father:  Post middle secondary  0.147  0.038  -0.031  0.028  -0.133  0.040
Household Characteristics:
Children 0-6 years  -0.009  0.008  -0.001  0.005  0.002  0.006
Brothers 7-14 years  0.023  0.014  0.004  0.008  0.002  0.010
Sister 7-14 years  0.025  0.016  -6.6E-05  0.010  -0.019  0.012
Males  15-59 years  -0.020  0.009  0.024  0.005  0.003  0.007
Females  15-59 years  0.010  0.010  -0.008  0.007  -0.001  0.007
Older than 60  0.010  0.020  0.004  0.014  -0.014  0.016
Muslim  0.039  0.027  0.055  0.019  -0.040  0.021
Catholic  0.120  0.031  0.021  0.022  -0.050  0.025
Protestant  0.140  0.031  0.052  0.019  -0.035  0.024
Other Christian  0.111  0.030  0.009  0.019  -0.031  0.023
(Log) per capita expenditure  0.060  0.018  -0.001  0.012  -0.014  0.014
Male head of household  -0.105  0.026  0.006  0.018  0.136  0.022
Age of head of household  -0.000  0.004  0.002  0.003  -0.005  0.003
Ageofheadofhouseholdsquared  -1.7E-05  0.000  -1.2E-05  2.74E-05  6.07E-05  2.85E-05
Household owns livestock  -0.084  0.043  -0.064  0.039  0.065  0.028
Household owns land  -0.054  0.019  0.003  0.013  0.035  0.016
Cost of Schooling:
Schooling  expenditure  1.07E-05  2.74E-06  8.75E-06  1.76E-06  2.08E-06  2.20E-06
Distance (in minutes)  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000
Location:
Accra  -5.032  . -2.141  . -2.835
Urban areas outside Accra  0.153  0.036  -0.146  0.033  -0.055  0.036
Rural Coastal  -0.088  0.032  0.075  0.022  0.070  0.022
Rural Forest  -0.007  0.025  0.150  0.017  0.034  0.019
Constant  -0.2447  0.317  -1.180  0.235  -0.313  0.259
Notes: The  coefficients  are  marginal  probabilities.  Number of observations  =  3516;  Wald  X 2(99) =  1082.58;
Prob > %2  = 0.000; Log likelihood = 4088.398;  Pseudo-R2 = 0.135.  Bold: Statistically significant  at 5 percent;
underline:  Statistically  significant  at  10 percent;  cursive: Statistically  significant  at  15  percent;  standard  errors
are robust Huber-White  Sandwich standard errors, White (1980).
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-.  '  :  '  '  :  CoefT.  .Std.error  Z-statistic  P-value
Individual characteristics:
Age  0.020  0.020  1.04  0.296
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -0.78  0.433
Female  -0.002  0.008  -0.26  0.794
Child of household  -0.790  0.163  -4.77  0.000
Parent  Characteristics:
Mother lives in household  0.065  0.024  4.16  0.000
Father lives in household  0.115  0.064  3.24  0.001
Household Characteristics:
Children 0-6 years  0.017  0.008  3.73  0.000
Brothers 7-14  years  -0.010  0.007  -1.56  0.120
Sister 7-14 years  -0.003  0.006  -0.50  0.618
Males  15-59 years  -0.003  0.006  -0.52  0.606
Females  15-59 years  -0.000  0.005  -0.04  0.967
Older than 60  0.005  0.016  0.28  0.777
Muslim  -0.020  0.009  -3.60  0.000
Christian  -0.423  0.178  -4.05  0.000
No religion  -0.016  0.008  -3.09  0.002
(Log) per capita expenditure  -0.021  0.010  -2.92  0.003
Male head of household  -0.102  0.067  -2.78  0.005
Age of household head  -0.004  0.002  -1.80  0.071
Age of household head squared  4.25E-5  2.03E-5  1.97  0.048
Land  -0.001  0.008  -0.13  0.895
Cost of Schooling:
Schooling  expenditure  3.27E-7  1.43E-7  3.19  0.001
Distance (in minutes)  -0.000  0.000  -0.78  0.437
Location:
Other urban  0.527  0.118  5.70  0.000
Rural Coastal  0.996  0.004  8.77  0.000
Rural Forest  0.295  0.070  5.56  0.000
Notes: The  coefficients are marginal probabilities.  The locational dunmny for Accra as well as the dummy
for  livestock  ownership,  "other  religion"  and  parents'  education  had  to  be  omitted  due to  collinearity,
number of observations  = 443; Wald X2(25)  = 125.38; Prob > %2  = 0.000; Log likelihood = -73.259;  Pseudo-
R2= 0.618; standard errors are robust Huber-White  Sandwich standard errors, White (1980).
43Appendix D: Predictions
Table Dl.  Predictions, GLSSI
Varijble*  -_School  only  Schooland.  Work only.  Neither
- ~~~work V
Full sample  34.1  13.7  25.1  27.1
Girls  33.2  11.0  23.8  32.0
Boys  35.0  16.3  26.2  22.6
Child of the household  35.3  13.0  25.2  26.5
Not child of the household  30.9  15.8  24.6  28.8
Mother no education  31.8  13.7  27.2  27.4
Mother primary  38.6  17.0  15.7  28.8
Mother middle secondary  44.0  12.9  17.8  25.3
Mother  some post-secondary  45.5  4.6  36.4  13.6
Father no education  28.2  12.1  30.0  29.7
Father primary  53.0  8.7  20.0  18.3
Father middle secondary  40.0  17.3  18.2  24.5
Father some post-secondary  40.8  17.8  17.1  24.3
Across expenditure quintiles:
Lowest  35.9  12.1  23.4  28.7
Next-to-lowest  33.0  14.1  25.0  27.8
Middle  34.5  13.6  24.9  27.1
Next-to-highest  33.8  15.1  25.2  25.9
Highest  33.0  14.3  28.1  24.6
Table D2.  Predictions, GLSS3
Variable  School  only  . School  and  Work only  Neither
-work
Full sample  31.6  17.6  18.1  32.8
Girls  30.1  16.8  16.6  36.5
Boys  32.8  18.3  19.4  29.5
Childofthehousehold  31.3  16.3  18.1  34.3
Not child of the household  32.8  22.9  18.1  26.2
Mother no education  28.0  16.2  19.2  36.6
Mother primary  43.2  21.5  16.8  18.5
Mother middle secondary  46.0  24.5  12.6  16.8
Mother some post-secondary  45.7  11.4  5.7  37.1
Fatherno education  25.1  13.9  20.7  40.3
Father primary  38.6  24.0  15.0  22.4
Father middle secondary  39.5  24.5  15.1  21.0
Father some post-secondary  51.3  16.7  9.2  22.8
Across expenditure quintiles:
Lowest  27.6  15.4  18.4  38.6
Next-to-lowest  30.9  17.5  17.8  33.9
Middle  31.7  19.2  18.4  30.6
Next-to-highest  32.4  18.6  18.4  30.7
Highest  37.7  17.9  17.2  27.2
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While the issue of child labor in developing countries has received increased attention
in recent years,  most of the empirical  analysis has been  based on one-time cross
sectional samples. While  this may give an  idea of the incidence and determinants of
child labor at one point in time, it is  silent about the dynamics of child labor over
time and sometimes  may even be  influencing policy choices against child labor
adversely. This  paper attempts  to fill this void, analyzing the dynamics of child labor
and schooling in Ghana, aiming at investigating the impact of broad economic reforms
on child labor and schooling  in the short,  medium and  long run.  Starting from a
premise that the simple - direct - relationship between poverty and child labor,
which  has often been  seen as the feature of child  labor,  may  not adequately capture
the multi facetted  nature of child labor,  we find evidence of asymmetries  in the child
labor-poverty link, as  well as quite complex dynamics  in the evolution of child labor
and schooling and their determinants over time. Most notably, child labor is  found
to be  responsive to poverty in the short run,  but not in the long run, while child
schooling is unaffected by poverty in short run  but responds in the medium-  to long
run. These  results suggest that child labor acts as an economic buffer of the household
in the short run,  regardless of changes in the economic environment or perceptions
of the latter following economic reforms, thus supporting - and refining - the  poverty
explanation of child labor.
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